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Modern society is highly dependent on undisrupted delivery of critical infrastruc-
ture services such as power, water and telecommunications. Real-time common
operating picture (COP) of critical infrastructure is required in order to com-
mand and control recovery from occurring disturbances. Various decision makers
require the real-time incident information and the state of critical infrastructure
in order to make the sound decisions affecting its operation. Additionally, crit-
ical infrastructure interdependencies are essential information for the decision
makers to achieve situational awareness including current and future state of the
infrastructure. This thesis presents requirements and architecture for a national
common operating picture system as well as system implementation suggestions.
Requirements for the COP system are defined after the composition of modern
critical infrastructure is studied and the operating environment is understood.
The common operating picture is provided through a flexible brokered agent-
based architecture which satisfies the restrictions presented by the critical infras-
tructure as an environment. Architecture components are designed in accordance
with Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) data fusion model to allow integration
of different critical infrastructure systems together. Generic agent component is
customized for each source system to produce events for three different analysis
components which produce meaningful objects, current state and future impact
estimations from the data.
Implemented prototype system is used to test and evaluate the COP system
architecture. Real world data from the intrusion detection system (IDS) and
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system was used to test the
integration of distinct systems. Performance of the implemented system was mea-
sured and determined to be sufficient to satisfy deployment scenario requirements.
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Moderni yhteiskunta on hyvin riippuvainen kriittisen infrastruktuurin tarjoamis-
ta palveluista, kuten sa¨hko¨sta¨, vedesta¨ ja tietoliikenteesta¨. Reaaliaikainen kriitti-
sen infrastruktuurin yhteinen tilannekuva, jonka avulla useat eri pa¨a¨to¨ksentekija¨t
pystyva¨t tekema¨a¨n ja¨rkevia¨ kriittista¨ infrastruktuuria koskevia pa¨a¨to¨ksia¨, on vaa-
timus ha¨irio¨tilanteista palautumisen johtamiselle ja ohjaamiselle. Lisa¨ksi kriitti-
sen infrastruktuurin sisa¨iset riippuvuudet ovat oleellisia pa¨a¨to¨ksentekija¨n tilan-
netietoisuuden saavuttamiseksi johon tarvitaan ymma¨rrys seka¨ kriittisen infra-
struktuurin nykyisesta¨ etta¨ tulevasta tilasta. Ta¨ssa¨ diplomityo¨ssa¨ esiteta¨a¨n vaa-
timukset ja arkkitehtuuri ja¨rjestelma¨lle, joka kykenee tarjoamaan kansallista ti-
lannekuvaa, seka¨ ehdotetaan menetelmia¨ ja¨rjestelma¨n toteuttamiseen.
Tilannekuvaja¨rjestelma¨n vaatimukset ma¨a¨ritella¨a¨n kriittisen infrastruktuurin ra-
kenteen perusteella seka¨ toimintaympa¨risto¨n ymma¨rta¨misen ja¨lkeen. Tilannekuva
tarjotaan joustavan agenttipohjaisen viestinva¨litta¨ja¨ arkkitehtuurin kautta, joka
ta¨ytta¨a¨ ympa¨risto¨n asettamat vaatimukset. Arkkitehtuurin osat ovat suunniteltu
JDL (Joint Directors of Laboratories) datafuusiomallin mukaan, mika¨ mahdol-
listaa erilaisten kriittisen infrastruktuuri ja¨rjestelmien integraation. Geneerinen
agenttikomponentti muokataan kohdeja¨rjestelma¨kohtaisesti tuottamaan tapahtu-
mia kolmelle erilliselle analysointi komponentille, jotka muodostavat merkityksel-
lisia¨ tapahtumaolioita, ajankohtaisen tilan ja tulevaisuuden ennusteen kera¨tysta¨
tiedosta.
Toteutettua ja¨rjestelma¨n prototyyppia¨ ka¨yteta¨a¨n testaamaan ja arvioimaan
tilannekuvaja¨rjestelma¨n arkkitehtuuria. Tosimaailman dataa tunkeutujan ha-
vaitsemisja¨rjestelma¨sta¨ (IDS) ja SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition) ja¨rjestelma¨sta¨ ka¨yteta¨a¨n testaamaan erilaisten ja¨rjestelmien in-
tegraatiota. Toteutetun ja¨rjestelma¨n suorituskykya¨ mittaamalla voitiin tode-
ta, etta¨ toteutettu arkkitehtuuri ta¨ytta¨a¨ ja¨rjestelma¨lle asetetut vaatimukset.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In 2007, Estonia was subjected to cyberattacks related to dispute about re-
location of the Second World War memorial statue [1]. The dispute was
between Estonians and Russians, as Estonians viewed the statue as a symbol
of Soviet occupation and wanted to remove it from the centre of Tallinn.
After the Estonian parliament adopted laws that allowed relocation of war
monuments, the statue was moved to an another site. The relocation was
strongly opposed by Russians, including the Russia’s state leadership, and
the dispute resulted in rioting and a subsequent network attacks. The first
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks were targeted against websites
of Estonian institutions and after a couple of days they expanded to include
Estonian DNS servers, Internet service providers (ISPs) and media. Attacks
lasted roughly for three weeks until the situation returned to normal, but the
aftermath lasted for months and revealed that most likely Russian govern-
ment were involved to the attack with some other participants [1]. Estonia’s
reaction was to start aggressively invest on national cybersecurity.
Another recent cyberattack that gained global attention was stuxnet
worm. It was a complex attack that targeted Iranian nuclear program. It
operated by disturbing nuclear research facility’s centrifuges by giving them
false data and causing machine malfunctions. Stuxnet was distributed via
USB memory sticks and it contaminated any Windows operating system it
came across. Nevertheless, it managed to remain undetected because the
actual warhead did not activate until it reached specific Siemens industrial
controllers that had correct model number, configuration details and program
code [14].Very sophisticated structure of the virus and the tightly specified
target indicated that it was not manufactured by a small but a large organi-
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
zation that had the appropriate resources for the task. Later it was revealed
that USA and Israel were responsible of the stuxnet worm [26], although it
already had been speculated widely. The attack was significant as it was
the first globally recognized incident where specific target was subjected to
a cyberattack in order to cause physical damage to the target system [10].
Aforementioned cyberattacks are good examples of modern cyberwar-
fare. Although both incidents can be categorized as cyberattacks, they differ
clearly on execution and impact. More specifically, they show the transition
from the traditional network attack to a genuine cyberattack where purpose
is to deal physical damage to the target system. The 2007 incident is an ex-
ample of the traditional network attack that utilized DDoS method, whereas
Stuxnet represents a cyberattack where the purpose was to damage industrial
equipment. The ability to damage physical infrastructure with cyberattacks
makes the threat very dangerous and at the same time very usable in a situ-
ations where traditional military operation is not a solution. When correctly
executed, the source of a cyberattack can be obscured enough to make it im-
possible to trace it. Additionally, cyberweapons are relatively reusable, with
such a modular design, that only small part must be tailored for a specific
target [11]. Because of these advantages, it is easy to understand why cyber-
attacks are actively used in modern global operations and pose a permanent
threat to all nations.
Modern national defence must take cyber threats seriously. Finland, as
well as many other nations, have addressed the threat by investing aggres-
sively on cyberdefence. In the year 2013 Finnish Security and Defence Com-
mittee provided national cyberstrategy guidelines for different government
authorities. This strategy aims to place Finland in the top country in the
area of cyber preparedness by the year 2016 [28]. Objective is very ambitious
but at least the strategy creates some form of organizational foundation that
is necessary for national cyberdefence to function. As we can learn from
Norwegians, it is very important that all relevant actors share the common
situational picture and work together in an effort to build a national cyberde-
fence system [20]. Additionally, it is important to share information between
other countries, to gain ideas and not to exclude possible future coopera-
tion. For example, Rantapelkonen and Kosola strongly suggest that Nordic
Countries should work closely together when facing cyberspace challenges
[23].
Modern society is strongly interlinked and is unable to function at its
normal level without few critical industry sectors, such as power, water and
telecommunications. Many different industry and service sectors can be qual-
ified as necessary for the modern society, but Ted Lewis[16] defines 11 sectors
that are critical for the operation. These 11 critical industry sectors are listed
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below and together they are referred as critical infrastructure.
1. Power / Energy
2. Water
3. Telecommunications
4. Banking & Finance
5. Transportation
6. Chemical Industry
7. Defence Industry
8. Postal & Shipping
9. Agriculture and food
10. Public health
11. Emergency Services
Security and Defence Committee’s report point out that in order to com-
mand and control disturbances that affect critical infrastructure, all parties
must have reliable and real-time operational picture of the nation’s critical
infrastructure [28, s. 4]. This common operating picture (COP) allows deci-
sion makers to gain a cyber situational awareness that is required in making
the coordinated decisions and react to situations such as cyberattacks. Pro-
viding a COP of critical infrastructure, as a part of national cyberdefence, is
far from trivial. As noted above, presented 11 sectors are mostly individually
administered and privately owned. Because they are not used to cooperate
together directly it is not easy to create a systems that could combine in-
formation from all sectors and produce the COP. Purpose of this thesis is
to define requirements and attempt to design a systems that is capable of
providing a COP of the nation’s critical infrastructure.
1.2 Research problem
Security of the modern IT systems have been a long time under active
scrutiny. Security mechanisms have been developed for years and many good
solutions for securing both independently administered and distributed IT
systems exists. Modern intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion pre-
vention systems (IPS) are able to detect malicious network traffic, although
with varying success rate, and this information is utilized in command centers
by security service providers.
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On the other hand, much of our society’s critical infrastructure is con-
trolled by industrial control system (ICS), such as Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed Control Systems (DCS), that
have traditionally been separate from IT systems. These control systems are
usually designed to keep production lines working and the security of the
system has been a secondary issue. Because our society is constantly inte-
grated more tightly together, usually via the Internet, this leads to situation
where these vulnerable control systems can be accessed directly from the
public networks. As Aalto university’s report on Finnish control networks
vulnerability [34] showed, there are at least 2915 various control devices ac-
cessible from the Internet. Many of them are poorly protected and utilize
systems that have known vulnerabilities. To make matters worse, some of
these systems are actively used to control parts of our critical infrastructure
such as industrial automation systems or power control and remote control
systems.
Figure 1.1: National common operating picture.
The problem from the national cyberdefence point of view is this frag-
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mented infrastructure that needs to be integrated together. Construction
of a common operating picture of critical infrastructure, to gain situational
awareness of the system, faces integration problems because multiple differ-
ent systems that are not iteroperable should work together and contribute
to common knowledge, as seen on Figure 1.1. In the figure, the common
operating picture is presented as composite of the different critical infras-
tructure actors (water and power delivery systems and telecommunication
network). Common operating picture should include only relevant informa-
tion to aid monitoring personnel to gain situational awareness of the critical
infrastructure.
Great variety of systems and devices, that are part of critical infrastruc-
ture, pose many challenges such as interoperability, data fusion and coor-
dination. For example, telecommunication and power delivery sectors are
interleaved in such a degree that disturbances on one directly affects the
other one. Therefore they must have some means to cooperate and change
information. Additionally, fusing together data from systems that generate
data with completely different content and volume is a challenge. For ex-
ample, whereas simple control station may be working or not working, some
IDS can generate vast amounts of data that may represent an intrusion to
the critical system. Finally, the coordination of different authorities in times
of crisis require the means to understand what is happening and how the
failing of one system affects to others.
Many additional integration problems arise from the different vendors
that are not allowing third parties to have access their systems. Addition-
ally, information security laws may restrict the methods available to gather
important information from the network. Regardless of these problems, a
way to combine critical information from fragmented systems is needed in
order to create a common operating picture of critical infrastructure.
1.3 Research questions
As mentioned in section 1.1, common operating picture of critical infrastruc-
ture is a major requirement for the national cyberdefence. A system must be
designed and built to integrate together many different kinds of independent
information sources to form a single national COP. Critical infrastructure
has evolved to complex entity with many interdependencies and interconnec-
tions. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the environment where the
COP system is operating. Limitation and requirements created by the crit-
ical infrastructure must be first acknowledged in order to understand what
solutions work and what design choices are mandatory.
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The first research question, this thesis should find an answers to, is what
kind of system is needed to create a national COP of critical infrastructure?
Defining a system specification for the system, which operates within critical
infrastructure environment, is the first task in order to answer the question.
The system specification should define the deployment environment as well
as the requirements placed by it. Additionally, when considering the overall
integration challenge we find out that the integration problem has many
similarities with multi-sensor data fusion systems. Data fusion systems has
been studied for many years for various applications and many well defined
suitable models exist for the COP system. Therefore, the specification should
also include an applicable data fusion model to be utilized within the system.
The second question for this thesis is how to implement the specified COP
system? Defining specification for the system is a necessary first step on the
development process but the aim of this thesis is to design a functional system
that can be implemented on national scale. Therefore, an architecture which
fulfills the system specification must be designed. The system architecture
is a necessary step towards the system implementation. However, on its own
it’s not enough to answer the presented question. Therefore, the system must
also be implemented in order to fully establish that the defined and designed
system is able to function and provide common operating picture of critical
infrastructure.
1.4 Limitations
The focus on this thesis is to define what kind of system is required to suc-
cessfully integrate data from different critical infrastructure actors together.
Security of the system itself is not a part of this goal and therefore most
security aspects are omitted from the study. Some security related problems
such as user authorization and data visibility are taken into account but the
question is the system itself a vulnerable to attacks is not examined.
Another purposefully omitted topic are the legal aspects of this kind of
system. As the goal is to define what the system should be able to do and
how to function, we can not be restrained by the current legislature. Again,
some subjects such as data privacy and confidentiality are considered, but
overall they are not the limiting factors for the concept.
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1.5 Results
The goal of this thesis is to define requirements and propose architecture
for a system providing common operating picture of critical infrastructure.
Additionally, the proposed architecture is implemented for the most part to
demonstrate that (1) the architecture is feasible to implemented and (2) it
can provide COP of critical infrastructure to the various decision makers.
The implemented COP system was finally evaluated against the require-
ments, placed by the critical infrastructure as a deployment environment,
and was found to be able to fulfill the requirements as well as integrate var-
ious source systems in order to provide common operating picture of critical
infrastructure.
1.6 Structure of the study
This thesis continues with chapter 2 where critical infrastructure sectors and
components are described. In chapter 3 we define requirements for the sys-
tem, specify what are the information sources as well as user of the system
and how the system can provide common operating picture for various par-
ties. Chapter 4 presents an architecture that is required to implement the
system. Different parts of the system are specified and their interactions
are defined. Chapter 5 shows a one possible way to implement the system.
Suitable technologies are selected and different parts of the system are imple-
mented and the implementation is evaluated against a requirements defined
on chapter 3. Finally, chapter 6 provides conclusions to the work.
Chapter 2
Critical infrastructure
This chapter provides an overview of critical infrastructure which consist of
multiple sectors that are interconnected and interdependent. Complex inter-
actions between many industry and public service actors are not trivial and
therefore they are examined closely to better understand how modern devel-
oped nation’s critical infrastructure operates. Additionally, a few prevalent
control and protection systems within critical infrastructure are presented
and studied briefly to understand how the various sectors control their op-
eration and protect their systems. Finally, the common vulnerabilities of
networked systems are highlighted.
2.1 Overview
Critical infrastructure has become the backbone of modern society as al-
most everything and everybody are dependent on services provided by it.
Although developed nations are depending on fully operational critical in-
frastructure, it contains far too many vulnerabilities and weaknesses to be
truly considered secure and robust. Therefore, it is necessary to identify
what exactly constitutes as critical infrastructure and what the vulnerabil-
ities are. The understanding of critical infrastructure is especially relevant
from the national cyber defense point of view as one can not successfully
defend something that he or she has not full knowledge of.
As presented on chapter 1, Lewis [16] separates critical infrastructure
in to 11 different sectors which are power/energy, water, telecommunica-
tions, banking & finance, transportation, chemical industry, defense indus-
try, postal & shipping, agriculture and food, public health and emergency
services. Although this taxonomy describes the critical infrastructure from
the United States of America point of view, it is applicable to any other
8
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developed nation as well.
In addition to the presented taxonomy, Lewis recognizes that the critical
infrastructure is highly complex with many interdependencies. Full con-
trol over this kind of interdependent system is difficult and foreseeing the
consequences of rare anomalies may be impossible without more detailed
information. To help perceiving the interactions within critical infrastruc-
ture Lewis presents an additional categorization of sectors in an hierarchical
model. The model allocates the 11 sectors in a three level hierarchy where
upper levels are dependent on the lower levels. The hierarchical model of
critical infrastructure is presented on figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Critical infrastructure composition.
Sectors belonging to level 1 are the most critical part of the national in-
frastructure as they provide the means for all other levels to operate. There-
fore, power, water and telecommunication sectors should be secure and re-
silient against threats and disturbances as all other sectors are dependent on
them. Lewis’ prioritized taxonomy can be utilized as a guideline to focus on
the areas that are the most important for the whole critical infrastructure.
It is necessary to note that dependencies within a single criticality level also
exists and together with cross level dependencies are the main challenge in
modeling and securing the critical infrastructure.
Lewis’ taxonomy can be reasonably justified by considering peoples daily
lives. Level 1 sectors are so deeply relied on in modern society that it has
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become almost impossible to operate without them. Power outages can be
devastating as we have no means to store electricity efficiently for long periods
of time. Information and telecommunications are requirements for the normal
operation of virtually every branch of society as the services are created and
offered through highly networked systems. Disruptions in fresh water delivery
affect large number of people especially in cities and other high population
areas. In a society where bottled water in not the primary source of water
the disruptions become very dangerous fast.
Justification for other levels can be similarly reasoned. For example if
level 1 services would cease to exist, they would be shortly followed with the
inability to pay anything, as most of the purchases are made with credit/debit
cards. Even automated teller machines (ATM) are network operated and
banks cash registers are not able to serve sudden surge of clients. Payment
problems and power outage would relatively soon affect the transportation as
gasoline pumping stations would be inoperable. Additionally, the disruptions
on continuous processes of industries such as oil refineries would have a long
term effect on other sectors such as transportation and energy.
Many seemingly important sectors such as public health and emergency
services are placed on level 3 because of their relatively small scale impact on
their absence. For example, power outages have almost instant effect on vir-
tually every persons daily operation as most of the electronic devices cease to
operate and telecommunication networks shut down soon after. Additionally,
most of the payments halt as electronic payment methods stop functioning
and people are unable to draw money out from ATMs. Therefore, after only
an hour almost all people are affected by the level 1 and 2 service unavailabil-
ity. However, the level 3 services affect a relatively small portion of people
within hours of their absence.
Dependencies within a single level are also inherent in modern critical
infrastructure. An example presented in figure 2.2 demonstrates that within
level 1 the information & telecommunication sector is highly dependent on
electricity suppliers. As power companies utilize communication networks
increasingly in their processes, the dependency is established in the other
direction as well. This kind of dependency network becomes highly complex
when operating at the national scale. The strength of Lewis’s taxonomy is
that it points out the dependencies between critical infrastructure sectors and
different criticality levels between groups of sectors. As all critical infrastruc-
ture actors are ultimately dependent on information & telecommunication,
power / energy and water suppliers, at least some focus can be aimed at
making them as secure and resilient as possible. Therefore, the taxonomy is
very usable by pointing out the critical infrastructure interdependencies and
the different levels of criticality.
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Figure 2.2: Critical infrastructure interdependencies [24].
Understanding the critical infrastructure composition at the high level is
an important first step when trying to defend it from external threats. The
second step from the cyber defense point of view would be to understand
how the various infrastructure actors operate and provide the services which
our society in so desperately dependent on. Modern networked control and
monitoring devices are prevalent within all critical infrastructure sectors as
they allow cost effective and flexible way to manage operation. As these
systems are increasingly utilizing public networks, such as the Internet, they
are allowing also network originated cyber attacks. Networked control devices
play a major role in modern critical infrastructure protection and therefore
they are examined more closely on next section.
2.2 Industrial control systems
Modern industrial processes have become complex and highly optimized in
order to carry out their operation as efficiently as possible. Critical infras-
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tructure actors, as well as any other industry actor, provide their services
through these processes and are highly dependent on their continuous and
correct operation. A lot of automation, monitoring and controlling equip-
ment is needed to achieve the efficiency and precision required by modern
standards. A general term for the system that is used to control various
industrial processes is industrial control system (ICS).
Industrial control systems are typically used to receive sensor information
from production process, automate and control the operation of a process
and allow the coordination between different processes. Widely used sys-
tems include for example supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
and distributed control systems (DCS). In addition to previously mentioned
tasks, these systems allow the management of processes remotely, between
many separate operation sites. Depending on the situation the control can
be centralized or distributed. Various industrial control systems have been
developed to facilitate requirements presented by different production envi-
ronments. Therefore, many systems that are categorized as ICSs are targeted
to handle slightly different tasks and deployment environments than others.
To gain some perspective, a few most widely used control systems and devices
are introduced below.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is a centralized
system for monitoring and controlling various production infrastruc-
tures. SCADA focuses more on coordination of the system functions
rather that controlling individual process elements. More detailed ex-
amination of SCADA is presented on section 2.2.1
Distributed Control System (DCS) is a broad term for systems where
control devices are distributed instead of centralized as in SCADA. DCS
allows direct control of devices as well as arrangement of devices in sub-
systems controlled by one control device. Task execution in distributed
control systems is sequential and chronological whereas SCADA is even
driven [18]. The process control in DCS is executed according to cur-
rent production parameters and the past process state. The focus on
DCS operation is not on alerts and unexpected process changes but
running the process as intended by controlling various component to
operate together.
Geographically-distributed critical infrastructure sectors such as gas,
water, electrical power distribution and railroad transportation utilize
widely DCSs as control mechanisms. These industries have strict re-
quirements on parameters such as reliability and low latency as they
are utilized in obtaining real-time telemetry and control real-world pro-
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cesses. Therefore, adding security mechanism for the systems is difficult
as they should be real-time, high-speed and have low-overhead in order
to avoid interfering with operation execution. [9]
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) is a device which gathers data from vari-
ous analogue sources and converts them to digital signals. Additionally,
RTUs are capable of receiving commands and forwarding them to the
specific field sensors. Traditionally RTUs have been very simple devices
but modern versions are capable of providing more diverse services such
as higher-level processing and remote configuration [18].
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a input/output device designed
to control various devices in real-time environments. Usually PLCs are
simple controllers containing logic and programming to allow the con-
trol of functions that do not require the supervision of process control
systems. PLCs offer different number of I/O ports to connect sensors
and actuators and have a specified scan rate. In addition to input
and output, PLCs usually contain necessary logic to prevent device to
function lower or above defined limit values and allow the continuous
operation even if connection is lost to the higher level controlling sys-
tem such as SCADA or DCS. Additionally, modern PLCs can have
more features such as user interface, ability to receive and respond to
process events, aggregate data and generate advanced reports [18].
One common feature for all industrial control systems is their purpose
to control real world processes. Usually strict operation parameter require-
ments, such as low latencies and real-time environment, have placed the em-
phasis on functionality. Security aspect of these networked control systems
have traditionally been only a secondary concern or ignored entirely. Ad-
ditionally, these systems have utilized proprietary communication protocols
which have been developed for a specific environment.
Since Internet services started emerge on the consumer markets in mid-
1990s, industrial control systems have been converging with IP networks.
Utilization of the Internet is constantly increasing among ICSs as the network
provides an easy connectivity across great distances and flexibility on services
and organization’s operating structure. Macaulay [18] provides a few other
reasons as why the convergence with IP networks has taken place:
• Operational costs can be reduced if physical and logical networks are
shared.
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• Common network technologies reduce networking costs and allow new
competition between device manufacturers to produce more features
and applications.
• Production is improved by new features and functions as well as allow
different lifestyles and working styles.
• More product flexibility can be achieved through new services.
The insecure nature of the Internet has presented serious security con-
cerns to these systems. Because control systems are evolved from propriety
systems that have been operating in isolated networks, they contain vulner-
abilities that were not previously considered. Vulnerabilities such as, lack of
encryption with open network standards and hardware default passwords are
problems on many legacy systems. Although latest generation of ICSs have
been developed with the security aspects in mind, many critical infrastruc-
ture actors still use old control systems in daily operation.
The term industrial control system it used to describe various control
systems targeted to different areas of industrial process control and man-
agement. Although these systems may have significant differences in their
operating principle and architecture they all share the common goal which is
to control and manage real world processes. As SCADA systems are preva-
lent in all industry sectors, they are a good example how engineers monitor
and control the production processes consisting of co-operating production
systems. Therefore, SCADA system’s architecture and components are ex-
amined more closely next.
2.2.1 Supervisory control and data acquisition
One of the most prevalent industrial control system is Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA). It is used for centralized control of various
production infrastructures. SCADA is utilized in process control to support
coordination of systems more than actually controlling various process ele-
ments. The responsibility of a SCADA system is to aggregate event data
from different process control systems. The focus is on unscheduled events
that are related to the changes in system processes. [18]
SCADA networks are deployed in many environments ranging from small
home automation systems to large geographically distributed systems. A
generic architecture for SCADA network, which allows the control and data
acquisition for local and remote sites, is presented on figure 2.3. SCADA net-
work can be separated to management and control network which provide
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communication channel for control center and local or remote sites, respec-
tively. Communication between control center and local or remote sites is
achieved through SCADA servers and possible external mediums such as the
Internet, leased lines or satellites [4].
Figure 2.3: Architecture of a generic SCADA network [4].
The control center provides a connection point for all sites. The center
includes devices such as SCADA servers, human machine interfaces (HMI),
engineering workstations, data historians, databases and other shared re-
sources [4]. SCADA servers manage the communication with the local or
remote sites as previously mentioned. Human operators utilize HMIs to
interact with the connected control and monitoring devices. Engineering
station provides higher grained control over the network itself and allows the
configuration of HMIs and other process control algorithms. Various process
parameters and control actions are stored in the database and the history of
system activities, such as network activities, sensor data and control actions,
are logged by the historian. Shared resources such as printers or file servers
are not directly part of the SCADA system.
Local and remote sites are connected to the control center’s SCADA
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servers and provide site specific control network for various devices. Con-
trol network contains components such as control devices, I/O devices and
a SCADA gateway. Control devices that are able to communicate directly
with the SCADA server are connected to the control network whereas other
components are connected through SCADA gateway which provides an in-
terface for the devices. Control devices such as programmable logic con-
trollers (PLCs), remote terminal units (RTUs), input/output controllers or
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) utilize I/O devices for controlling and
monitoring the process itself. Controlling and monitoring is accomplished
with sensors and actuators which are capable of measuring specific process
parameter and perform control actions, respectively.
First versions of SCADA systems employed a relatively primitive commu-
nication methods for linking different control components together. Data and
control message transmission focused on operational requirements and didn’t
place much weight on security aspects because SCADA systems were physi-
cally and logically isolated from other networks [4]. As the systems evolved
and adapted to new technologies through redesign and integrated compo-
nents, many security vulnerabilities emerged because the old technologies
were not designed to operate in the new environment.
Usually the ICSs are long time investments for companies and have oper-
ating period of decades. Therefore, the replacement of old vulnerable systems
is balanced with resources and perceived threat posed by the systems. Con-
sequently, there are currently many old and vulnerable systems in daily op-
eration. Even within critical infrastructure sectors the amount of vulnerable
control systems is alarming [34].
2.3 Security systems
Critical infrastructure sectors integrate information and telecommunication
technologies increasingly with their own operations. Modern IT systems are
prevalent in all industry and service sectors as they provide means to vastly
improve competitiveness and productivity. Although these systems are nec-
essary for achieving normal operational level, they are vulnerable to external
and internal threats. The major incentive for companies to invest on secu-
rity has been to protect their core knowledge and ensure continuous operation
without disruptions. Consequently, modern security requirements are usu-
ally understood and protection systems such as intrusion detection systems
(IDS) and firewalls are commonly in use to protect company’s networks.
While ICSs provide information of the industry’s ongoing processes, mod-
ern IT security systems can offer more detailed information of the current
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level of security and possible attacks targeted to the core systems. As IT
systems are currently inherent part of critical infrastructure, data provided
by them should be utilized when trying to gain full situational awareness of
critical infrastructure. Figure 2.4 presents simple network containing both
firewall and IDS to provide security for a small organization. As the firewalls
and IDSs are the basic security components in today’s networks they are
examined more closely next.
Figure 2.4: An example of a small organization’s network.
Firewall
Firewall is a basic operational security component found in almost every
protected network. It is usually combination of hardware and software and it
operates by allowing some packets to pass through and blocking others. The
purpose of a firewall is to separate organization’s network from the insecure
network it is connected to. Moreover, a firewall provides means to control
what traffic is allowed to gain access to the administered network.
Firewalls can be classified into three categories by their operating princi-
ple: traditional packet filters, stateful filters and application gateways [13].
Traditional packet filters inspect each packet separately and determine if the
packet should be allowed to enter the network. Inspection is based on packet
header data such as IP addresses, port numbers, used protocol, etc. Tradi-
tional packet filters are restricted to examine each packet in isolation one at
a time. Stateful filters on the other hand monitor TCP connections over a
established sessions. By monitoring sessions, the filter is able to distinguish
and allow packets that belong to a connection which is initiated from the
secure network. Finally, the application gateways are servers that manage
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all application specific traffic. They allow access to external network only
from selected applications and block others.
Firewalls are an important part of all networks as they provide the most
basic protection by restricting the access to the organization’s network. Fire-
walls are usually the first devices in protected networks that can detect sus-
picious network anomalies and therefore can provide the first alarm of such
events. For example suspicious port scans and denial of service attacks can
be detected on firewall an reported onwards. Firewalls can provide valuable
information for common operating picture and therefore should be utilized
as information sources.
Intrusion detection systems
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) provide more thorough packet inspection
services than firewalls. As firewalls are limited to inspect data from packet
headers, IDS’s are capable of inspecting the packet content. This deep packet
inspection is required in order to detect transmitted malicious data such as
a virus. One major difference to firewall is that IDS do not prevent the data
traffic if anomalies are detected but only report their findings for example
to network administrator. Systems which provide reporting and filtering
services are called intrusion prevention systems (IPS)[13].
IDSs can be classified by the way they detect attacks as either signature-
based systems or anomaly-based systems [13]. Signature-based systems in-
spect the content of a packet or packets and compared the data against sig-
natures corresponding to known attacks. Signatures are generated usually by
professionals who know how the attacks are implemented. The major prob-
lem with signature-based systems is the requirement for the signatures which
means that the system is unable to detect yet unknown attacks. Anomaly-
based systems do not suffer from this weakness. Instead of signatures they
monitor normal operation of a system and try to detect anomalies in packet
streams such as unusual amount of ICMP packets or port scans. Although
they are able to detect unknown attacks, detecting statistically unusual traf-
fic from normal traffic is a major challenge [13]. Therefore, most of currently
used IDSs are primarily signature-based.
Intrusion detection systems are currently a hot research topic as better
and more accurate detection algorithms and method are required. Currently
the major problem with IDSs is the high false positive alarm probability.
In high traffic environments too many false alarms make the system unus-
able because actual attacks can not be identified. However, IDSs are already
prevalent and are able provide large quantities of usable information of many
different ongoing attacks. Therefore, their output is good input for the com-
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mon operating picture system.
2.4 Vulnerabilities
Presently, threats directed towards the critical infrastructure are not lim-
ited to traditional system failures, human errors or natural disasters such
as storms. Because telecommunication networks are integrated to all levels
of critical infrastructure new threat in form of a cyber attacks is also pre-
sented. As the cyber threats focus on affecting critical infrastructure through
telecommunication networks they are operating through networked control
devices. These remotely controlled devices play a major part in modern
critical infrastructure protection.
Previously introduced industrial control systems, such as SCADA and
DCS, have traditionally been separate from IT systems. These control sys-
tems are usually designed to keep production lines working and the security
of the system has been a secondary issue. Because our society is constantly
integrated more tightly together, usually via the Internet, this leads to situ-
ation where these vulnerable control systems can be accessed directly from
the public networks. As Aalto university’s report on Finnish control net-
works vulnerability [34] found, there are at least 2915 various control devices
directly accessible from the Internet. Many of them are poorly protected
and utilize systems that have known vulnerabilities. To make matters worse,
some of these systems are actively used to control parts of our critical infras-
tructure such as industrial automation systems or power control and remote
control systems.
2.5 Summary
This chapter presented the composition of modern critical infrastructure.
Section 2.1 showed that critical infrastructure has become a highly intercon-
nected system where almost every sector is dependent on one or more sectors.
Networked control systems, presented on section 2.2, create new types of vul-
nerabilities to the critical infrastructure which must be understood in order
to protect and have resiliency against emerging threats. Viewing of the crit-
ical infrastructure as an dynamic environment is required in order to design
a system that tries to integrate information from various source systems.
Therefore, knowledge of the composition, interconnections and components
of critical infrastructure must be utilized in the development of common
operating picture system.
Chapter 3
System specification
This chapter provides a specification for the common operating picture sys-
tem. Firstly, various available information sources within critical infrastruc-
ture are recognized and the targeted users for the system are defined. Sec-
ondly, the main requirements placed by the critical infrastructure are identi-
fied and recognized. Additionally, a data fusion model which is able to suc-
cessfully integrate various source systems together is proposed. As a whole,
the chapter provides guidelines for the subsequent architectural design.
3.1 Information sources
Modern society is greatly dependent on the services provided by its critical
infrastructure. Sectors such as telecommunications, water and power delivery
are the key sectors required to sustain normal operation. These three with
other eight sectors presented on figure 2.1 provide the basic services for the
society. Although the sectors are vital to the functioning society, there is not
currently an established means to view the state and complex interdepen-
dencies of critical infrastructure as a whole. The need for a system capable
of presenting common operating picture (COP) of critical infrastructure is
therefore substantial. As mentioned in chapter 1, the COP of critical in-
frastructure is a requirement for the functional cyber defense. Additionally,
whole society and many decision makers within critical infrastructure could
benefit greatly from the COP. High level decision makers could make precise
decisions regarding the whole infrastructure as well as individual actors could
coordinate their operations and prepare for possible problems.
The previously mentioned 11 different critical infrastructure sectors and
their control and security systems are the main sources of information when
constructing the common operating picture. Most of the data from the sec-
20
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tors is produced from the systems presented on sections 2.2 and 2.3. Addi-
tionally, many other networked devices can provide valuable information and
could be utilized on monitoring the critical infrastructure state. Similarly,
the information gathering doesn’t need to be limited on critical infrastruc-
ture actors but can span over all possible sources in order to provide more
detailed overall system state.
Industrial control systems are utilized in roughly similar manner in vari-
ous environments within critical infrastructure. However, the ICSs are only
one type of information sources and systems such as communication net-
works and financial sector produce vastly differ data both in quantity and
content. Therefore, it is necessary to allow heterogeneous data from source
systems because too much information is lost if all data is strictly formal-
ized in common variables. Consequently, the COP system must utilize the
variable data and allow the system experts to determine what incidents are
critical for their systems.
A system, trying to integrate together all critical infrastructure actors
with varying priorities, needs to take seriously the question of why would
the different actors participate to the common operating picture system.
Participation, if not legally required, would require voluntary investments in
resources and time to successfully adopt the system. Therefore, the incentive
to participate should come within the organization itself. The main goal for
achieving this is to produce the service in a way that participants can receive
value through the utilization the common operating picture by themselves.
It would be beneficial to many critical infrastructure actors to have real-
time information of the surrounding services which they are dependent on.
The state information can be shared to the all participating parties and thus
create an incentive to participate and provide data to the common operating
picture system.
3.2 Users
In order to successfully develop a system that provides value for the various
end users, it is important to understand how and by whom the system would
be utilized. Various users and the deployment environment guides the design
parameters in all system levels from architecture to user interface. Critical
infrastructure as an environment sets many requirements which must be ac-
counted for. Additionally, the requirements set by various users must be
considered. For example, critical infrastructure actors have different values
and priorities regarding the security of their systems or information sharing
with other actors.
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The main goal for the common operating picture system is to improve
situational awareness of it’s users. One widely accepted definition for sit-
uational awareness is Endsley’s model (Figure 3.1) which consist of three
different levels: perception of elements in current situation, comprehension
of current situation and projection of future status [6]. According to Ends-
ley, these three steps are required for the person to be able to gain situation
awareness in dynamic systems. Consequently, the common operating picture
system should provide means for the user to be aware of various incidents
occurring within critical infrastructure, understand the current state and
have an projection of possible future status of observed part of the critical
infrastructure.
Figure 3.1: Required levels to achieve situation awareness [6].
Endsley’s situational awareness model is applicable to every person uti-
lizing the system. However, the users of the system are not a homogeneous
group of people but consist of diverse selection of personnel in various or-
ganizations with different backgrounds. Additionally, the system is targeted
to supports decision making on many different authority levels ranging from
single critical infrastructure actor to government officials. Although the user
base is broad, it can be divided to two different groups, system operators
and authorities. These user groups contain the target users for the common
operating picture system and are the main focus from the COP system point
of view. The difference between system operator and authority user groups
is defined with more detail below.
System operator is the person who is utilizing the common operating pic-
ture system to gain information corresponding on ones own system.
The one feature that system operator has over the authorities, is the
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ability to directly control own system. For example, in production plant
the system operator could monitor their own system and other critical
infrastructure actors which they are dependent on. The operator has
the ability to adapt their own operations according to the occurring
situation by configuring their own system or preparing for the possi-
ble future problems such as power outages or resource transportation
problem.
Authorities are users that are making relatively high level decisions con-
cerning the various critical infrastructure actors. Authorities do not
have a direct control access to the source systems but monitor and re-
act to occurring situations within critical infrastructure. On this level
the common operating picture system can provide valuable informa-
tion for example public safety services to react quickly and efficiently
to current incidents and prepare themselves for the future situations.
3.3 Requirements
New technologies and systems are constantly introduced within critical in-
frastructure sectors to manage their operations. Different sectors are becom-
ing increasingly interconnected and technologies such as modern networks are
integrated to all levels of the infrastructure. Continuously evolving systems
create many restrictions for the information gathering and integration. In
order to accomplish the information integration the system itself should be
to some extent service oriented [12, s. 57]. In order to further determine the
requirements for the system the Figure 3.2 presents an outline of the COP
system placement in the information loop.
3.3.1 Integration
The problem from common operating picture point of view is the fact that
different critical infrastructure industries are individually administered and
usually do not have means to share data between each others automatically.
Additionally, the various critical infrastructure systems produce data which
varies greatly in quantity and content. This kind of environment sets strict
requirements for the system intended to collect and combine data from vari-
ous sources. Another problem is that many automation and control systems
are closed and vendor specific and as such may not easily be modified by the
customers. Therefore, information from the systems need to be gathered in
a way that requires and expects as little as possible from the target system.
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Figure 3.2: Information loop.
Additionally, it is not feasible to pack raw data from each system together
as we easily loose the system specific knowledge.
Operating critical infrastructure is a system where various incidents occur
constantly. Consequently, active monitoring can be achieved by collecting
and analyzing critical infrastructure incidents. A specified communication
format is required in order to collectively handle the incident data. Therefore,
source systems should generate events from the incident data and forward
them to the COP system. Events should have a common format which is
independent from the observed system and they should include information
such as the incident properties and how severely it affects the source system.
As the systems vary greatly from each others the format should be flexible
and allow various types of data to be transmitted. Additionally, the format
should be easily extensible to allow functioning in evolving environment. The
event format and content is defined with more detail in section 3.4.
As the focus of the common operating picture system is the information
collection from the critical infrastructure actors, there is no need for the con-
trol channel to the source systems. As Figure 3.2 presents the actions of
decision makers bypass the COP system entirely. Therefore, it is sufficient
that information can be collected from the source systems and the control
channel can be separated from the system itself. The source system control
should be excluded from the COP system for many reasons such as infor-
mation security, vulnerabilities, vendor specific systems and overall system
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complexity. Source system control should always be handled by the local
operator/administrator as they have the knowledge of how their system op-
erates an what actions are needed in various situations.
Although the information can be collected from the critical infrastructure
as events, the analysis of the diverse data sources is not a trivial problem.
Even if the format is common for all events the content can vary greatly
between different source systems. Therefore, analysis of the events present a
data fusion problem which must be solved in order to form a coherent COP
of the critical infrastructure. Fortunately the data fusion field can provide
many models to help fusing heterogeneous data together. One model that is
extremely suitable for situational awareness system is JDL model and it is
examined more closely on section 3.5.
3.3.2 Dependencies
One major requirement for the system is to handle interdependencies exist-
ing within critical infrastructure. As the critical infrastructure offers services
that are vital to the society, it is necessary to be able to present the in-
teraction of different actors in a way that supports situational awareness.
With proper tools the complex dependency network can be obtained within
the critical infrastructure and it can be subjected to comprehensive scrutiny.
The primary goal for the COP system is to offer tools to examine the state
of critical infrastructure where the dependencies are a crucial part of the
analysis.
Although source system generated events are good for monitoring real-
time incidents within critical infrastructure, they do not provide a good way
to deliver dependency information from the various systems. Few funda-
mental differences between events and dependency information exists that
suggest different handling mechanism for them. Firstly, the existing depen-
dencies are somewhat static and do not change frequently. Therefore, there
is no need to send real-time information to define them. Secondly, they
are usually not associated with occurring incidents but define the system’s
place among other systems. Consequently, dependency information should
be obtained through other means than through events.
One clear restriction affecting the storage of dependency information is
that access to data should be restricted at least on some level. It could be a
serious defensive vulnerability to allow possible attackers free access to cur-
rent and up to date information of critical infrastructure dependencies. Rea-
son for active reconnaissance is to find out this kind of information and the
available dependency database would offer just that to the malicious actor.
Consequently, although information should be accessible to relevant parties
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the access control and information restriction should be implemented for out-
side users. Additionally, even within allowed parties everyone shouldn’t be
able to see all dependencies but only the set that affects them directly.
3.3.3 Scalability
Scalability is a major requirement for the common operating picture system
as the goal is to allow nationwide implementation. The more there are infor-
mation sources in the system the more detailed and current overall situation
can be constructed. Therefore, the system must be designed in a such way
that adding new information sources to the system increases resource require-
ments as little as possible. Network utilization between source systems and
analysis components should be flexible enough to allow traffic load sharing
between multiple servers.
In accordance to the JDL model, source preprocessing acts as a first
level filter to the system. The level 0 has two important roles from the
scalability point of view. Firstly, preprocessing allows the addition of new
source systems which may be considerably different from the other ones.
The level 0 component is responsible for gathering the data from the system
and generating events which have common format within the COP system.
Therefore, the COP system can scale to support vastly different systems that
may produce data in highly distinct ways. Secondly, the preprocessing acts
as a low pass filter when it analyses and categorizes the source systems raw
data. The rationale behind filtering is that only relevant events that affect
the operation of the system itself and the others that are dependent on it
are reported. This is especially important when the system is operating at
a national scale and the amount of event data could easily overwhelm the
system servers.
Although core analysis components of the system are affected by the
number of source systems that produce events to the system they should not
be the bottleneck. As the JDL model levels 1 to 3 are all able to continue the
filtering of the input data they can retain the traffic volume on such levels
that the core services are not congested. Especially level 1 object refinement
has an important role as it is the first analysis component handling the
events. Although the filtering can reduce the load to other levels, the level
1 should support load balancing to multiple servers. As the level 1 analyses
more about individual source systems than dependencies between them, it is
possible to separate the processing to multiple independent servers.
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3.3.4 Visualization
The user base division to operators and authorities presents clear require-
ment for supporting different levels of data visualization. Various decision
makers require different pieces of data and the common operating picture
system should be able to offer them for each user. High level decision maker
does not need to have detailed information of the occurring incidents as he
has no mean to react to them. For example, if a power station generates
an event concerning a failed transformer the authority should receive the
information only if the incident greatly reduces the power plants ability to
provide power to other critical infrastructure actors. However, the system
operator is definitely interested in this kind of information because he can
react to the incident by notifying maintenance staff.
In addition to incident filtering, the dependency information should be
presented with different levels to the users. For the system operators it is
only necessary to show states of those critical infrastructure actors which the
operated system is directory dependent on. On the other hand, authorities
require access to the dependency information across the critical infrastructure
in order to construct a operating picture of whole critical infrastructure. This
kind of restriction to the dependency information directly requires that user
authorization mechanism are employed.
Although allowing users to view the available information from multiple
points of view, it is also important to remember the diverse background of
the users. With common operating picture system the user base consists of
users with varying technical understanding. For example, high level decision
makers may not be experts of the source systems and only rely on general
information depicting the overall critical infrastructure state. On the other
hand, systems operators utilizing the COP system may be very interested
on more detailed information and have a good knowledge of their source
system and its properties. Therefore, the goal for the visualization should
be to allow the display of data on varying technical levels. How to visualize
the COP in a correct way is not covered within this thesis, but remains as
a requirement for the COP system to allow possibility for multiple different
ways of presenting the data for the users. More detailed study of how the
common operating picture should be visualized is presented on paper [25].
3.4 Event
Various incidents occur constantly within dynamic systems such as critical
infrastructure. Different systems produce different types of incidents and the
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severity of their effects is mostly system specific. Occurring incidents within
critical infrastructure can be expressed as events, produced by critical infras-
tructure actors. Events should be the main communication format between
common operating picture system and source systems. In order to efficiently
process the events, they should contain information such as incident severity,
category and other relevant data. Dependency information is not included
in events but are obtained through other channels. The following definition
can be used to describes the event within common operating picture system.
Definition 1. Event is an action or occurrence detected by a program or
operator that is relevant in the operation of the observed system or environ-
ment.
As noted on section 3.1, critical infrastructure source systems produce
data on vastly different quantity and content. Because the systems are dif-
ferent and have varying priorities the event content should be as flexible as
possible. As source systems can utilize the common operating picture system
by them selves the event data should not be restricted to a common content.
The Ideal format for the flexible data content is key-value pair element list
where reserved keywords are specifies from the COP system and additional
data element can be used freely. Consequently, common data elements can
be utilized by the COP system as well as other monitoring parties and addi-
tional field can be used by the source system operators them selves.
Table 3.1: Event severity
Severity Description
Performance
reduction (%)
Very High
Performance of the system is severely
degraded.
80-100
High
Performance of the system is signifi-
cantly degraded.
60-80
Moderate
Performance of the system is moder-
ately degraded.
30-60
Low
Performance of the system falls below
objectives but remains well-above min-
imum requirements.
10-30
Very Low
Performance of the system is not
severely affected.
0-10
Few fixed parameters are needed for events in order to process them
efficiently. Parameters that are relevant from the common operating pic-
ture point of view are event severity and category. These two parameters
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are mandatory for every event. Event severity describes how severely the
occurred incident affects the source system operation. Within critical infras-
tructure the interest is in how well the system is capable to continue it’s
operation and therefore the focus is on performance reduction. An event
severity scale focusing on system’s performance is defined on article [7] and
presented on table 3.1.
Table 3.2: Event categories
Category Description
Unauthorized
Access
Unauthorized physical or electronic access to
a computer system or network
Denial of Service
Any action which results in loss of system
or network services normally available to au-
thorized users. (Intentional, unintentional,
electronic, digital or of natural cause)
Malicious Code
Malicious code that was installed on exe-
cuted on an IT system
Improper Usage
Violations of acceptable use and security
policies by authorized users
Scans, Probes,
Attempted
Access
Unauthorized System, network, IP, Port,
Service mapping scans or probes and unsuc-
cessful access attempts
Investigation
Events where a particular activity is sus-
pected but unconfirmed. Once the activity
is confirmed events are reassigned to the ap-
propriate category
Another fixed parameter, event category, plays an important role in event
analysis and situational awareness as it is used to understand what is occur-
ring within monitored systems. In critical infrastructure context the cate-
gorization must contain various event types from simple hardware failures
to cyber attacks. Technical document from multinational experiment 7 [21]
defines a usable event categorization which is presented on table 3.2.
By using the following severity and category definition the system experts
can define rules for producing events for the common operating picture sys-
tem. In addition to event severity and category the key-value pairs should
be reserved for the common use. The source system experts can and should
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produce any information they consider important by using their own keys if
necessary. Using keys outside reserved ones does not need to be reported to
other parties but they can still be utilized by the operators.
3.5 Data fusion
As described on section 3.3, common operation picture system must inte-
grate information from multiple different sources in order to help users to
achieve situational awareness of critical infrastructure. The data sources in
this context are information systems that are part of critical infrastructure.
This includes wide variety of devices such as intrusion detection systems,
firewalls, building automation systems and power management systems. Be-
cause the information sources may be very different, they produce highly
distinct data that can not be integrated together directly. This problem is
identical to multi-sensor data fusion systems, which Mitchell [19] defines as
”the theory, techniques and tools which are used for combining sensor data,
or data derived from sensory data, into a common representational format”.
Therefore, we can utilize research on the field of data fusion to find a model
that is suitable for the basis of the common operating picture system.
Data fusion systems have been studied for many years and various models
and frameworks exist to guide designers. These models are applicable in
cyberspace to detect intrusions and attacks against a system [3]. Choosing
the right model is not trivial and it may be that no single model is suitable.
As Navarro concluded [22], it is an infeasible task to try find a model that
is explicit and suitable for implementation of any system. He states that
one should consider data fusion models as a collection of ideas that should
be combined in the implementation of a real fusion system. Consequently,
the system implementation should not be the main focus when choosing the
fusion model.
From theoretical point of view, there has been some research that sug-
gest that Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) data fusion model is suitable
and should be applied in cyber defense systems [8, 27]. Additionally, JDL
data fusion model has common components with Endsley’s situational aware-
ness model (figure 3.1) and supports the situational awareness process [33].
Therefore, the JDL data fusion model is proposed as the basic guideline for
the system design.
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3.5.1 JDL data fusion model
The Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) within the US Department of
Defence (DoD) has defined a framework that has become widely used in the
data fusion field. Because the model is developed to aid military application
development, it has qualities that make it notable in the cyber defense system
point of view. JDL model describes a data fusion process that combines data
from various sources in order to better understand the observed situation
[31]. Fusion process consists of different levels that combine data and make
inferences about the information within a context.
JDL model has been revised over the years and many papers are written
on adapting the model on different applications. One article applies JDL
process for cybersecurity and describes the interaction of different levels in
cybersecurity domain [8]. This model review, depicted on Figure 3.3, is
very beneficial to the common operating picture system. As the diagram
shows, the process model consist of sensors and six different fusion levels.
Sensors are various information sources, such as IDSs, firewalls or log files.
The level 0 fusion process is responsible for aligning the input data in a
common format that the system is able to handle. Level 1 combines the level
0 data to identify observed incidents from multiple sensors. Level 2 fusion
process forms a system level perspective from the current situation, and level
3 predicts future state of the system. Level 4 process can manage the sensors
and allow the fusion process refinement. Level 5 is the interface between the
system and the human operator. All aforementioned 6 processing levels and
sensors are needed to gain a situational awareness of the system of systems
[8]. Therefore, we define and examine each part in the cyber security context
more closely below.
Sensors
Cyber security sensors are devices or data sources that provide observation
data from various systems. Obvious sensors would be for example network
IDSs and firewalls which provide information such as logged events, intru-
sions, operating systems and application versions. Additionally, every source
system that is part of critical infrastructure behave as a sensor from the com-
mon operating picture point of view. Consequently, the data fusion process
doesn’t care of the sensor is one IDS or a SCADA system spanning over large
geological area.
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Figure 3.3: JDL data fusion process model.
Level 0 - source pre-processing
Input on level 0 process comes from the sensors and enables the system to
interpret and refine the data. As mentioned above, the input for this process
varies from sensor to sensor. Some of the low level data can be simple network
packet captures or log files, whereas more sophisticated sensors such as IDSs
can provide already refined data from the underlying processes. Regardless
of the level of the input data, source data must be pre-processed to a format
that can be integrated together with data from other sensors. This formatted
data is the output of level 0.
Level 1 - object refinement
Level 1 processing identifies objects from a data for example by mapping IP
addresses to host names. Additionally, this level collects the states of the
objects. For example, commands that one user has issued could be gathered
from the log file data, or alerts from multiple IDSs could be combined to
create state of the attack. On the other hand, the state of the device could
be just an indication if it is available or not. Output of his level should be
the identified objects and their properties.
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Level 2 - situation refinement
The objective of situation refinement level is to combine individual objects,
created by level 1 process, and infer the current system state based on these
entities. This process is the first step where situational awareness of the
system is acquired. For example, the system vulnerabilities are required in
order to gain a situational awareness of the system security level. Therefore,
attacker’s capabilities need to be recognized and combined together with
current system state. Output of the level 2 fusion process must be the infor-
mation about the network state, attacker’s capabilities, what attacks have
occurred and whether those attacks have been successful or not [8].
Level 3 - threat refinement
Threat refinement process is responsible for assessing the future impact of
the attacks. Understanding the system vulnerabilities enables the process
to analyze what are the attacker’s options to continue the attack. Addi-
tionally, it is important that this process is aware of the available tools that
are in attacker’s disposal. Databases such as common vulnerabilities and
exposures (CVE)1 are useful to gain such an understanding. Output of the
threat refinement should be the types of detected attacks and what are their
implications.
Level 4 - process refinement
Level 4 is a meta-process that observed the fusion system takes input from
outside of the system [8]. Process refinement is responsible for tasking sensors
by giving them for example new IDS rules or anti-virus definitions. Addi-
tionally, the process tries to find out what sensor should be looked at more
closely and what data one should try to find out. For example the operator
could define that specific protocol should be given more attention and level 4
process should adapt the system to deliver more information from requested
protocol. It should be noted that usually this process requires a human oper-
ator to make the decisions on where to look and what. Therefore, the process
is relatively slow and situation dependent.
Level 5 - cognitive refinement
Final level of the JDL model Is the human-computer interaction (HCI). This
level should provide an overview of the system state for the operator. Ad-
ditionally, the operator must be able to get more detailed and filtered data
1http://cve.mitre.org/
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from the areas of interest. Because the human operator has a crucial role in
the decision making chain, in the situational awareness system, the presented
views should be flexible and easy to understand. The design should take in
the account the fact that operators of the system may not always be network
experts but personnel that are responsible of strategic decisions.
3.6 Summary
This chapter provided system specification for the common operating picture
system. Requirements and guidelines were defined for the subsequent archi-
tectural design. Four major requirements were defined: ability to integrate
information from different source systems, provide the data from critical in-
frastructure interdependencies, scale to the nationwide implementation and
finally to allow visualization of the COP from multiple perspectives to the
various decision makers. Together with JDL data fusion model the speci-
fication should help to achieve a system architecture which is able provide
common operating picture of critical infrastructure.
Chapter 4
System architecture
This chapter provides architectural design for a common operating picture
system. The presented design complies with the requirements presented on
chapter 3 and provides guidelines for system implementation. Various system
components and their interactions are defined according to the JDL data fu-
sion model as well as previously defined requirements. Proposed architecture
should provide means for the implementation of common operating picture
system.
4.1 Scope and requirements
The main goal for the common operating picture system is to provide com-
prehensive and real-time COP for various decision makers. Consequently,
the system architecture must provide a platform supporting data collection,
integration and analysis of different critical infrastructure sectors. Addi-
tionally, the resulted data must be presented to the users through a user
interface which supports varying information levels and multiple viewpoints.
This chapter presents a model architecture which is able to provide an usable
platform to satisfy the requirements set for the system in chapter 3.
The main requirement for the system architecture is to provide means to
integrate critical infrastructure systems together. Integration of various sys-
tems should be achieved by collecting incident data in the form of events. As
the various source systems produce data that differs greatly, JDL data fusion
model should be utilized in the foundation of the common operating picture
system. Different JDL data fusion processes should be supported in order
to successfully support situational awareness of the COP users. The source
system control mechanisms are purposely left outside of common operating
picture system.
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Another important feature that should be supported by the system ar-
chitecture is the critical infrastructure interdependencies. Interdependencies
are extremely important for the common operating picture as they are the
only means for understanding and determining the future state of the critical
infrastructure. Therefore, the COP system must provide means for collecting
dependency information from the source systems and allow the information
distribution to the analysis components. As the dependency information is
very sensitive, the availability must be controlled as well as security aspects
ensured.
Finally, requirements such as scalability and data visualization must be
supported in order to allow implementation in national scale and to support
decision making for different users. The system architecture must satisfy
all previously specified requirements in order to produce functional common
operating picture system. Following list sums up the main requirements.
• Integrate critical infrastructure systems by collecting events and sup-
porting all JDL data fusion model processes
• Handle critical infrastructure interdependencies
• Allow different data visualization levels
• Must be scalable in order to support nationwide implementation
4.2 Design choices
The following section present a architectural design choices that satisfy the
requirements set for the common operating picture system.
4.2.1 Agent-based
Large number of different and constantly evolving source systems can not
be trivially integrated together. Big data system, where raw data from the
source systems is gathered and analyzed, is not feasible in this context be-
cause no one entity can understand the operation of all critical infrastructure
branches. Additionally, most critical infrastructure operators are privately
administered and use equipment that vendors are usually not allowing ac-
cess to. The problem is reduced a little within critical infrastructure as there
are only a handful of vendors that provide industrial control systems [15],
but when considering the whole critical infrastructure the problem remains.
Therefore, we can conclude that a system specific component is required to
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collect, filter and transmit information from the source system to the COP
system.
System specific component which is able to integrate various systems to-
gether can be accomplished with software agent. An agent-based architecture
where each source system is integrated through customized agent software is
the appropriate solution for the integration. The agent can collect informa-
tion from the system and produce output that can be processed collectively.
Additionally, it allows integration of different critical infrastructure systems
together without losing the knowledge of the source system experts as they
are utilized in customizing their agent. The responsibility of the expert is to
define rules for the agent to detect important incidents that affect the system
operation. Additionally, more sophisticated analysis means such as anomaly
detection can be utilized in incident detection. The responsibility of agent
customization should be on system experts because they have the full knowl-
edge of the source system. Additionally, they are able to separate incidents
that are critical to the operation of the system from the unimportant ones.
By default, the agent component should have low requirement for pro-
cessing power and storage. However, an agent should store recent events to
the local database whether or not it has transmitted them to the COP sys-
tem. Reason for this, is that these event are accessible on request if needed.
For example, agents that produce large amount of events, can be configured
to send only events that have severity level above some threshold. If however
the operator would like to examine the agent more closely it can request the
previously insignificant events in order to carry out more rigorous analysis of
the source system state.
The information about the state of the system is very important from
the operational point of view. Maintaining the state information of each
source system could be implemented on the agent, but there are few reasons
why it shouldn’t. Firstly, in many environments it is better to keep the
agent functionality as simple as possible. If the agent focuses on simply
producing events it has considerably lower complexity and requires much less
administrative resources to be kept up to date. Secondly, there are situations
in which the state of the agent is dependent on the external actors such
as power or telecommunication providers. For example, the source system
itself can be fine but is not operating because thy are affected by external
interferences such as a power outage. To keep the agent complexity low it is
better to keep the state of the system within the COP system instead. The
main drawback in the separation of source system state and agent is that
determining the system state from the event data may not reflect the reality
closely enough. Additionally, if the system state is determined according the
incidents there is no a direct way to determine when the system is recovered
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from the failure. Despite of mentioned drawbacks the low complexity of the
agent is the greater factor as the main goal for the system is to provide means
for reacting occurring incident.
4.2.2 Broker
JDL data fusion model is central for the system architecture. The model’s
level 0 is directly comparable to the agent component and the other levels fit
well in the critical infrastructure environment and support situational aware-
ness. Although the process model itself does not take stand on architectural
decisions, it defines required steps the system must be able to offer. The ar-
chitecture must accommodate all six data fusion processes and allow them to
work together in a flexible and scalable way. Inter-component communication
channel is a key feature allowing the operation in distributed environment
and implementation on national scale. Sufficient communication channel can
be achieved with a common message bus.
Requirements for the common message bus is firstly to have capacity
to handle large amounts of messages from multiple sources and secondly to
allow the routing of message to one or multiple destinations. The message bus
must allow a large number of agents to send information from their respective
systems to the COP system. Additionally, in must allows flexible and scalable
way for a component to communicate with any other one within the fusion
chain. Role of the message bus is central to the functioning of the system.
Therefore, it is important to be able to scale the capacity by distributing the
load to multiple servers as well as ensure service availability by duplicating
the access points.
Message bus and the components can be developed by various technolo-
gies. The bus could be implemented, for example, as an enterprise service
bus (ESB), p2p network or a cloud service. The most important function
of the message bus is to allow large number of agent to send their event to
the analyzers. Additionally, there may be separate analysis components that
require the same streams through broadcasting. It is necessary to keep the
system simple to manage and especially the agent should be able to run on
low end equipment. The question is, which solution is the most applicable
in this kind of environment?
One of the best architectures for this kind of environment is brokered
architecture. Broker can be seen as cloud service where group of servers to-
gether offer message transfer services. Various services such as broadcasting
and bi-directional messaging can be offered with little overhead. Same events
can be directed to multiple destination at almost simultaneously. Addition-
ally, as most of the communication between component are fire and forget
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types, it can be easily scaled to handle all communication between various
system components.
4.2.3 Registrar
Dependency information of various critical infrastructure source systems is
in a major role within the COP system. Handling, updating and storing
of the information has many requirements that are previously described.
However, the COP system needs a way of storing and sharing the dependency
information for parties that are allowed to obtain and require the information.
The information storage itself can be designed to be centralized or de-
centralized. As different participants of the system are already committed
to produce and customize their agent software the simple method would be
to include the dependency information directly to agent. This would allow
the privacy for the dependency information but the problem would emerge
in sharing and acquiring the information. For example if only the agents are
aware of dependencies how would they know which other agents they are de-
pended on. Although distributed solutions such as P2P hash tables exist for
sharing data over distributed systems, they introduce unnecessary security
problems [29]. Therefore, a centralized system is the choice for registrar as it
can offer better security and access control to different parts of information.
The dependency information should be stored at a centralized registrar
component (Figure 4.3), where system administrator can register their agent
and define dependencies to other agents. Centralized solution allows the
control of information visibility to different users. Additionally, dependencies
can be defined between all registered agents. Although the data is stored in
a centralized registrar system the responsibility of keeping the dependency
information up to date should be on the source system administrators i.e.
same person who is responsible for the agent customization.
Although handling the dependencies is the primary task for the registrar,
there are few other topics it is required to address. The first and most
important one is agent registration and identification, which is required for
separating and linking events to source systems. Because a large number of
agents may be present, the id space should be large. Additionally, identifiers
should be allocated randomly to make it more challenging to brute force
or guess used id’s. The second is the handling of user accounts that are
used to operate within the system. User accounts are necessary for assigning
ownership status to the agents. The registrar component should be able to
provide all mentioned functions.
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4.2.4 Visualization
Common operating picture system is intended for various decision makers
that require varying levels of information. The exact specification for the
data visualization is out of scope for this thesis but the system architecture
must allow the data presentation from many different view points. Therefore,
a view component is required which handles the data presentation and offer
an user interface to the system.
User interface should be offered through an Web application as it is easily
usable in any modern computer such as laptop, desktop computer or com-
puter backed monitoring room. Access through Web browser makes the user
interface resilient and removes the need for any additional software installa-
tions from the user. Web interface can easily provide different levels of data
visibility by filtering the information allowed to various users.
View component handles the presentation of current and future critical
infrastructure state to the users. The component acquires the data directly
from the event streams or by requesting it from the analysis components.
Because the message bus is able to offer event streams to all willing parties,
the view can simply listen the generated event streams. The data requests
are executed through component interfaces.
Another task for the view component is to offer users the means refine
the system operations. Tasks, such as controlling the reported event severity
level of the agent or setting certain incident thresholds for analysis compo-
nents, should be managed through the view component. There are of course
authorization limitations on who can do what, but the default principle is
that owners of agents should be the only ones able to control operations that
affect them.
4.3 Analysis
The core task for the COP system is to analyze agent generated event streams
and create a comprehensive common operating picture from the data. The
analysis component produce event on different levels, which are object, state
and impact. These states follow the JDL data fusion model and handle the
tasks defined in section 3.5. All analysis component are connected through
the message bus and therefore can be distributed to separate servers. How-
ever the state analyzers require access to common database in order to de-
termine state for the whole system, and the impact analyzer requires access
to dependency information between different source systems. The analysis
subcomponents are examined with more detail below.
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4.3.1 Object
Object analyzer is responsible of handling the events that originate from
agents. It analyses the event streams and filters out undesired events. Addi-
tionally, object analyzer can detect and generate new event from the received
ones. For example if many different agents are reporting port scanning inci-
dents, one larger alert which contains all targeted systems can be generated.
Because object analyzer component analyzes event streams complex event
processing tools should be utilized [17, 30, 35].
4.3.2 State
State analyzer forms states of all source systems based on object analysis
events. Here the state is linked with agents and stored in database. State
information is constantly updated and new events are generated as the state
changes. Additionally, current states of the agents can be queried through
the message bus by other components.
4.3.3 Impact
Impact analyzer focuses on determining the future state of the critical in-
frastructure. Dependency information between different source systems, i.e.
agents, is required for the analysis to allow various network analysis methods
to be utilized. For example vulnerability analysis can be performed to detect
critical nodes or how failures propagate through the critical infrastructure.
Additionally, the alarms can be quickly propagated to specific source systems
to inform incidents such as power ot telecommunication outages.
4.4 Components
Previously defined architecture components such as agent, view and ana-
lyzer are the basic building blocks of the common operating picture system.
Figure 4.1 depicts common operating picture system placement in the infor-
mation loop which contain source systems, COP system and decision makers.
The common operating picture system interacts with various source systems
through an agent component which gathers data from the system. Interac-
tion to the decision maker is achieved through the view component which
presents the common operating picture to different decision makers. Con-
trol channel shown in diagram between decision maker and source system
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Figure 4.1: COP system placement within the information loop.
is not part of the COP system and not specified with more detail. Gener-
ally it means a direct control of system operator or possible actions from
authorities.
The arrows in figure 4.1 depict the exchanged information format as the
loop is traversed. Raw data from the source systems is extracted by the
agent component and passed forward as events in a common format. COP
system then analyses the events and creates a common operating picture
which is shared to the decision makers to help support situational awareness.
Decision makers then make decisions according to their perception of the
situation and in a way or an another perform actions that affect the source
system.
The common operating picture system’s internal information flow is lim-
ited between the agent component and the view component as these are the
two interfaces that connect the system to the information loop. The in-
ternal information flow can be simplified according to the figure 4.2. From
the perspective of the system it is sufficient to perceive that information is
received through the agent component and forwarded through the view com-
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Figure 4.2: Data flow within COP system.
ponent. The one new required component is the analysis block which creates
the actual common operating picture. Creation of the COP is achieved by
analyzing the collected events and fusing the data with metadata such as
dependency information.
Figure 4.3: COP system components.
The system components should be as separate and independent as possi-
ble. Each component should define an interface that other components are
able to use through the message bus. Interfaces allow the addition of third
party services to the analysis chain which could offer more sophisticated re-
sults and complement basic functionalities provided by COP system. Figure
4.3 presents a critical system components and their relation to other com-
ponents and message bus. Registrar component requires a database for the
dependency information and user accounts whereas the analyzer component
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requires a database for data fusion purposes.
Figure 4.4: System architecture with JDL model.
Figure 4.4 depicts a logical architecture diagram for the COP system
framework that follows the JDL model. All fusion sub processes are han-
dled with respective components which communicate through the common
message bus. Separation between domain and COP entities presents the
administrative boundary between systems. The agent acts as a middle com-
ponent between the separately administered source system and the COP
system. Event analysis is separated into three different components which
together, provide current and future state of the critical infrastructure. The
analysis result is presented to the users through the view component in the
form of common operating picture.
The message bus acts as a intermediate service for routing messages be-
tween components. It does not orchestrate the operation in any way, but only
allows inter component communication. All the operation logic and actions
originate from the components and users. The message bus, i.e. broker, and
other presented components together form a COP system framework which
allows the integration of data from separate critical infrastructure sectors.
4.5 Summary
This chapter provided the system architecture for common operating pic-
ture system. The resulted design is agent-based architecture with a brokered
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message delivery service. Registrar component is utilized in agent identifier
allocation as well as user account management for user authorization. Ad-
ditionally, the interdependency information is handled and stored through
the registrar. Analysis components are designed according to the JDL data
fusion model and provide current and future impact estimations to support
situational awareness. Visualization is provided through Web applications
which allow flexible utilization of the system and can easily provide user
specific perspectives to the data.
Chapter 5
System implementation
This chapter provides an example implementation of the common operating
picture system. The system is implemented according to the architectural
designs provided in chapter 4. Modern implementation technologies are cho-
sen to allow fast development without sacrificing robustness. The system is
implemented from the most part to demonstrate that the proposed archi-
tecture is feasible to implement and is able to provide common operating
picture of critical infrastructure.
5.1 Technologies
The COP system was implemented from the most parts in order to test the
proposed architecture. Modern programming technologies was used to allow
fast development and yet to offer robust operation. Different system com-
ponents are implemented using Spring framework1 which is an open source
application framework for the Java platform. Provided user interfaces utilize
Spring Web MVC (Model View Controller) framework to implement Java
Web applications. Web application services run on Apache Tomcat2 server.
Implementation technology for the broker had to be chosen from multiple
available candidates. The message broker which allows the inter-component
communication is a central for the system architecture. Apache ActiveMQ3
message server was chosen to implement the broker because it fully supports
java message service (JMS), is scalable and released under Apache 2.0 Li-
cense. Other possible broker technologies, such as XMPP and IRC, did not
have as good support for transferring arbitrary objects. ActiveMQ supports
1http://www.springsource.org/spring-framework
2http://tomcat.apache.org/
3http://activemq.apache.org/
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a large variety of client programming languages and protocols. Together with
Apache Camel4 the broker server supports Spring remoting for easy to use
Remote Method Invocation (RMI). Spring remoting and RMI allow the com-
munication between different components in as simple way as using regular
java interfaces.
Many system components require a database to persist data. The imple-
mented Java components utilize Hibernate5 ORM (Object-relational map-
ping) to persist Java objects directly to the database. Hibernate supports
multiple databases and therefore the selection of database is less important
because the underlaying database can be easily changed to another if re-
quired. All server components utilize PostgreSQL6 database as it is consid-
ered very stable and robust. The agent component utilizes H27 database as
it’s lightweight and can be embedded to the agent component.
It is necessary to keep in mind that although these technologies were cho-
sen to suit the task, they are not the only possibilities for the implementation
of the COP system. Many choices were affected by the previous experience of
the author and on many situations the usability of the technology weighted
more than performance.
5.2 Broker
ActiveMQ broker provides two different communication channels for inter-
component communications, topics and queues. The difference between the
two is that a topic is a type of broadcast channel whereas a queue can be
compared to unicast channel. Both channels can have more than one content
providers and listeners but the difference is that topic messages are forwarded
to all listeners as the queue messages are forwarded to the next available
listener. i.e. only one recipient. Because of these characteristics the channels
are utilized in different situations.
Topics are used within COP system when a message could have more
than one recipient. For example, agent generated events are transmitted to
the event topic which can have multiple listeners. If an user would like to see
raw unfiltered events from the agents, the view component could read the
event topic simultaneously with analyzer and display the events even if the
analyzer would discard them. Additionally, topics are useful when different
analysis components would be implemented to listen the same even stream
4http://camel.apache.org/
5http://www.hibernate.org/
6http://www.postgresql.org/
7http://www.h2database.com/
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and handle the input separately. Within COP system implementation agent
generated events and analysis subcomponent (object, state, impact) events
are transmitted to respective topics which allows an easy access to the data
fusion chain from any component.
Queues are used for one-to-one communication. For example, the reg-
istrar service and its interface is available to other components through a
registrar queue. The utilization of queue does not exclude the possibility of
two different registrar servers to handle the incoming messages. However, if
there would be to separate registrar servers listening the queue, the messages
would be forwarded to first available registrar. This kind of system makes
it easy to distribute load of slow running tasks to multiple servers. Agents
utilize queues to form a control channel towards them from the COP system.
Each agent is listening a queue which matches the identifier allocated to the
agent. This way each operational agent will automatically be able to receive
control messages such as adjustment of the threshold of reported events. All
system services and agents therefore utilize queues.
On the communication protocol level the ActiveMQ supports both TCP
and UDP for the message transfer protocol over the network. Within the de-
velopment phase the TCP was used because the reliable connection between
communicating parties was deemed more important than the performance.
However, in a final system the UDP would be preferable choice to handle at
least the delivery of agent generated events. UDP would not require keeping
the communication channel constantly alive and would be much more robust
against DoS attacks[5].
5.3 Components
System implementation follows SOA principles in a way that system com-
poses of individual services that communicate through the broker. Various
system components such as agent, registrar and analysis components are
separate Java applications and do not require to be executed on a same
server. Because the components can run independently and they communi-
cate through the broker the architecture becomes very flexible. For example,
in addition to agents, the registrar and analysis components can be deployed
on any computer with network access and from there provide services for
other component querying them through the broker. The requirement of
course is the available network connection between a component and the
broker.
Registrar and view components provide user interfaces through Web ap-
plications. Consequently, they are a little less independent as they require
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Figure 5.1: System component distribution to servers and source systems.
Java web server to be deployed on. However, they are not restricted to be
deployed on the same server and can also be distributed to separate servers.
Figure 5.1 presents the interactions and example distribution of different com-
ponents. More detailed examination of the implementation of each system
component is presented below.
5.3.1 Registrar
Registrar service is responsible of handling agents that are registering to the
COP system. Registrar component is prerequisite for the system as it is
responsible for the user management and agent identifier allocation. Agent
IDs are realized as universally unique identifiers (UUID) which are generated
when user registers an agent to the system. All agent are associated with the
registered user and therefore the visibility of IDs can be restricted according
to the user authorization. The registrar component offers an interface for the
other component for user management, agent registration and information
queries. The most relevant methods are presented below.
registerUser(User, Role)
registerAgent(Agent) : UUID
getAgents(User) : List<UUID>
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getAgent(UUID) : Agent
createDependency(Dependency)
As the few above method show, users and agent can be registered through
the registrar and queries can be executed for the agent IDs. Additionally,
the registrar offers a method for creating dependencies between two agents.
The dependency information contains the IDs of both source agent as well as
the target of the dependency. Additionally, information such as the time the
source agent can operate if the dependency target fails and human readable
description of the dependency are stored. Registrar, as other components, is
a fully independent component which is able to operate by itself.
Figure 5.2: Part of the registrar’s user interface presenting an information
and telecommunication sector agent.
Figure 5.2 presents a screen capture from the registrar’s user interface. In
the figure one registered agent is selected and information such as the agent
ID, sector and company are displayed. New dependencies to other agents
can be defined by selecting target agent from the drop-down list and defining
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critical time for the dependency, i.e. how long the system can operate if the
target of the dependency fails.
5.3.2 Agent
Agent components is source system specific and therefore distributed to ev-
ery site that generates data to the COP system. Produced events are sent
through the ActiveMQ broker and by default received by the analyzer com-
ponent. Events are encoded according to the Common Event Format [2]
(CEF) in order to uniformly handle the data.
The agent is composed of two different parts, base agent and plugin. Base
agent handles the tasks that are source system independent and common for
all agents, such as event transmission to the COP system, timestamping
and logging. The purpose of the plugin is to adapt the agent to the source
system in order to allow information extraction from it. With this kind
of modularization the source system expert is not required to develop the
whole agent but instead can concentrate on the information extraction and
determining which pieces of information are important enough to be reported
to the COP system.
Utilization of the base agent is very simple. The plugin Java application
is only required to create an instance of base agent and send the generated
events through provided methods, as shown below.
// Create base agent with an ID
Agent agent = new Agent ( id ) ;
// Generate new event
Event event = new Event ( cathegory , s e v e r i t y ) ;
//Put ex t en s i on s as key value p a i r s
event . addExt (” l a t ” , 6 0 . 0 1 2 3 ) ;
event . addExt (” lng ” , 2 4 . 0 1 2 3 ) ;
event . addExt (” desc r ” , ” Desc r ip t i on o f the event ” ) ;
//Send event
agent . sendEvent ( event )
The agent ID must be obtained manually through the registrar and pro-
vide for the base agent as a parameter. New event can be created from
the source system generated data by specifying event category and sever-
ity. Additional information can be added as key value pair extensions. The
event transmission is achieved as easily as calling the base agents method for
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transmitting the event to the COP system.
In addition to event transmission, the base agent provides simple event
logging functionality in case of COP system requires past data. The COP
system can query the events generated in the past directly from the agent
through the channel defined on subsection 5.2. Additionally, the base agent
provides control for the threshold of event transmission. For example, if the
source system generates many low severity events that are not desired from
the COP system, the reporting level of the incidents can be adjusted based
on event severity. In a such case the agent would only log the event and
not transmit it to the broker. Consequently, the plugin does not need to be
changed at all.
5.3.3 Analyzer
Analyzer component handles the incoming events which are processed accord-
ing to JDL data fusion model. The component consist of three (3) different
subcomponents which are object, state and impact components. Each sub-
component produces their output as events on separate broker topics which
are named after the respective subcomponent. The event stream analysis it-
self is beyond the scope of this thesis but the presented framework provides a
channels for the analysis to be carried out. Tools and methods which should
be utilized in the analysis are not defined here although the Complex Event
Processing (CEP) techniques seems to be promising at least in the object
subcomponent [17, 30, 35].
5.3.4 View
View component provides the main user interface to the COP system. It
gathers the information from other components and presents them with dif-
ferent perspectives to the various decision makers. The main requirements
for the Web interface is to visualize current critical infrastructure state to
the users in way that observer’s situational awareness is improved. In or-
der to gain full situational awareness the system should provide help on
understanding the impact of various occurring incidents. As with the analy-
sis component, the detailed specification of the user interface is beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, the good specification for the Web interface
is presented by Rummukainen in paper [25]. Developed setups for the user
interface is presented on Figure 5.3
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Figure 5.3: Visualization setup for the COP system [25].
5.4 Evaluation
Proposed system architecture and the implementation was evaluated against
a requirements defined on section 3.3. Integration, dependencies, scalability
and visualization were all taken into account in the system architecture. Ta-
ble 5.1 presents how the designed and implemented system stands against the
main requirements. Reflecting the resulted system against the operational
scope shows that the requirements are fulfilled. For example, the integration
of virtually any system can be achieved through agent based approach. De-
pendency information is collected by the registrar component and distributed
from there to other system components. Brokered architecture allows easy
load distribution and both centralized and decentralized services. Evaluation
of the visualization is presented by Rummukainen [25]. Following subsection
present more detailed tests for integration and performance.
5.4.1 Integration
To test the integration of various source systems few different agents were
implemented. As the agents use the common base agent, it is only required
to implement a source system specific plugin in order to integrate different
systems to the COP system. Below is presented two different agents which
utilize the same base agent and implement a system specific plugin for parsing
the source system data. Implemented agent are for IDS and SCADA systems.
CHAPTER 5. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 54
Table 5.1: System evaluation
Requirement Evaluation
Integration Various critical infrastructure systems are integrated
utilizing customizable agent component. The agent gen-
erates events from the source system and transmits them
to the COP system. The data fusion process follows
JDL model and therefore supports all levels of situa-
tional awareness. With the agent component, virtually
any system can be integrated to the COP system. The
source system specific agent is able to extract informa-
tion from the system according to the system adminis-
trator defined rules. As the data extraction is customiz-
able, the source systems can vary greatly and does not
need to be modified at all.
Dependencies Interdependencies existing within critical infrastructure
can be collected through the registrar. As the system
administrators are the ones creating and updating the
information, there is no need for an active party who
is responsible to maintain data up-to-date. Obtained
dependencies can be utilized in the analysis chain after
they are defined by the system administrators.
Visualization Separate view component offers the possibility to pro-
vide multiple different viewpoints from the same under-
lying data. Additionally, as the view component utilizes
other system components and can be duplicated, there
is no limit of what kind of visualizations can be created.
Therefore, the architecture provides flexible data pre-
sentation support as well as means to create completely
distinct visualizations if required.
Scalability Distributed system architecture can be easily scaled if
required. Broker servers can be duplicated to offer
more message delivery capacity. Additionally, analysis
of agent generated events on JDL level 1 (object refine-
ment) can be separated to many servers which are able
to filter events for the next fusion level. Consequently,
the event filtering can be used to maintain system traffic
on such levels that supports large amount of agents in
distributed locations.
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IDS
IDS data can be acquired directly from the generated log entries. Agent
plugin in this scenario is therefore very simple as the plugin is only required
to read a log file and generate new event for new reported incident. For
example, Stonesoft’s security management center [32] can generate log entries
directly in common event format (CEF) as shown below.
CEF: 0 | Stone so f t | Aler t | 5 . 5 . 0 | 3 1 8 9 4 5 |MSRPC−TCP CPS−
Windows−MSRPC−SRVSVC−Unicode−Buffer−Overflow | 1 0 | spt
=15743 dev i c eExte rna l Id=Dubai V i r tua l FW 5 node 1
dst =86 .60 .73 .52 cat=Compromise app=Microso f t−DS r t=
Mar 20 2014 15 : 09 : 54 d e v i c e F a c i l i t y=In spec t i on msg=
Connection dropped act=Terminate proto=6 dpt=445 s r c
=181 .66 .48 .91 dvc =127 .0 .6 .165 dvchost =127 .0 .6 .165
cs1Labe l=RuleId cs1 =261002.0 cs3Labe l=
V u l n e r a b i l i t y R e f e r e n c e s cs3=CVE−2008−4250,BID−31874 ,
MS08−067
The resulted event is easy to parse according to the CEF specification [2].
Additional information, such as event category, can be added by the system
expert.
SCADA
SCADA plugin parses the system snapshot file generated on regular intervals
from the SCADA system. The difference to the log file is that whereas the
log file listener can be notified from the new lines in the file, the snapshot
contains the current system state and changed element must be detected by
the plugin. Therefore, the plugin must keep the state information by itself
and generate new events only when new elements appear on the output for
the first time. An example SCADA snapshot file with ongoing power outages
can be seen on appendix A.
5.4.2 Performance
Broker performance was tested by generating events from agent and exam-
ining the event throughput. Agent was run on the same virtual server as the
broker in order to minimize network latency effects on the measurements.
The server resources included 2 GB of RAM and 8 CPUs with relatively small
usability priority. Generated events contained information such as the event
severity, category, human readable description and latitude and longitude
coordinates for the occurred incident. With the included packet overhead
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Table 5.2: Broker throughput
Run 1 2 3 4 5 6
Events / s 237 255 270 286 265 298
(transmission protocols and Java/Spring metadata) the event packet sizes
were about 1300 Kbit. Table 5.4.2 presents the measured event throughput
from different runs.
The average throughput was 257 events per second which is sufficient for
the COP system deployment scenario. Consequently, considering the test
server’s modest resources, the measured event throughput is excellent and
demonstrates that the used technologies are suitable for the system.
5.5 Summary
This chapter provided an example implementation of the proposed COP sys-
tem architecture. Chosen technologies were sufficient for the prototype and
should to be fitting for the implementation of the real system as well. Imple-
mented system demonstrated the ease of integrating different source systems
together with proposed agent-based architecture. Additionally, the flexible
intercomponent communication and load distribution allow the implemen-
tation on national scale. Consequently, the proposed architecture is able to
provide common operating picture of critical infrastructure.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary
Critical infrastructure has become highly complex system of systems. Var-
ious interdependent critical infrastructure systems are separately adminis-
tered but require tight co-operation in order to provide their services. Con-
sequently, the common operating picture is required in order to command
and control disturbances occurring within critical infrastructure. The main
goal of this thesis was to design a system capable to provide common operat-
ing picture of critical infrastructure to various decision makers. Additionally,
a system prototype was needed to demonstrate that the proposed design can
be feasibly implemented.
As a deployment environment, the critical infrastructure places many re-
quirements for the COP system. The most important ones being ability
to integrate data from different critical infrastructure sectors, obtain depen-
dency information between different systems, provide visualizations for vari-
ous decision makers and offer scalable architecture to allow implementation
on national scale. Additionally, identifying users and defining characteristics
of various information sources are important for architectural decisions.
Useful common operating picture should improve the situational aware-
ness of its users. Authorities would benefit greatly from the COP but so
would various critical infrastructure actors. Both authorities and individual
actors should adjust their operations according to their surroundings. For
example, the faster disturbances within power delivery systems are acknowl-
edged by the actors, the faster the dependent systems can react and prepare
for the situation. Therefore, the incentive for the various actors to participate
to the COP system should come from the utilization of common operating
picture by themselves. Consequently, the system should provide tools and
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visualization that take both of these user groups into account.
Understanding the information sources is another important part of the
system design. The main information sources are industrial control systems
within power and water sectors as well as information security systems within
information and telecommunication sector. However, these are not the only
sectors that are part of critical infrastructure. For example, public health and
financing sectors produce data that differs greatly from the ICSs. Therefore,
an event based communication with flexible key-value pair content should
be used to transfer information from various systems. Additionally, the JDL
data fusion model should be utilized as it offers a fusion model which com-
plements all levels of situational awareness.
Proposed system architecture has been developed to fulfill mentioned
strict requirements and to account critical infrastructure as an operating
environment. Brokered agent-based architecture is scalable and offers an ef-
ficient way to integrate various source systems together. Utilization of JDL
data fusion model defines necessary step to integrate various systems and
provide common operating picture which improves situational awareness of
users. The registrar component offers a way to collect dependency infor-
mation from source systems and allowing system administrators to keep the
information up-to-date.
System components should be as independent as possible. Managing in-
dividual services becomes increasingly efficient compared monolithic systems
when the operating environment evolves as fast as critical infrastructure.
Additionally, the brokered architecture allows multiple implementations of
individual components and therefore creates possibility to develop services
side-by-side providing better and more accurate results. The pros of bro-
kered architecture can be seen also at the analysis component as the first
level object analysis can easily be implemented on parallel processes improv-
ing scalability and efficiency of the whole system.
Separation of agent registration and dependency information collection to
separate registrar component is an important part of the system. With this
kind of architecture, the COP system administrators does not have to consist
of experts from each connected source system. By distributing the admin-
istrative responsibilities to the source system experts, in the form of agent
customization, registration and managing dependencies, the data privacy and
administrative boundaries does not have to be compromised. Consequently,
the COP system itself can focus on producing common operating picture of
the whole critical infrastructure in a best way possible.
A prototype system was implemented according to the proposed archi-
tecture to confirm that the system can be feasibly implemented. Moreover,
the implemented prototype system demonstrated that the architecture is ap-
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plicable within the defined operational scope. Two different source systems
were integrated through customized agent components and the critical sys-
tem parts were implemented to create a framework supporting the creation of
common operating picture. Although some parts of the architecture were not
fully implemented, there should be no reason they would become an obstacle
for the full system implementation.
The resulted system specification, architecture and implementation de-
fined a system which is able to provide common operating picture of critical
infrastructure. Consequently, this thesis provided answers to the research
questions concerning what kind of system is needed to create a national
COP of critical infrastructure and how to implement the specified system.
The resulted system was found to be able to fulfill the requirements placed
by the critical infrastructure environment and provide common operating
picture of critical infrastructure.
6.2 Suggestions for further research
The architecture and implementation guidelines presented on this thesis al-
low the integration of critical infrastructure systems. The framework provides
a platform for generating features such as visualization of the common op-
erating picture and analysis of the dependencies between different systems.
Therefore, further research should be directed to analyze agent generated
events according to the JDL data fusion subprocesses and improve the visu-
alization to offer better situational awareness for the decision makers.
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Appendix A
SCADA snapshot
<?xml version=” 1 .0 ”?>
<outages>
<outage ID=”106” type=” f a u l t ” s t a r t=” 26 .09 .2013 10 :35
” end=” 26 .09 .2013 16 :58 ” desc=”Equipment f a i l u r e . ”
>
<s t a t i o n code=”77889” l a t=” 62.5537927000000 ” lng=”
24.0668504000000 ” area=”North” customers=”9”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”34321” l a t=” 62.2508442000000 ” lng=”
23.7804274999999 ” area=”North” customers=”5”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”61616” l a t=” 61.8640298000000 ” lng=”
25.1910932000001 ” area=”East” customers=”5”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”10101” l a t=” 61.4950159000000 ” lng=”
23.7773393000000 ” area=”South” customers=”10”/>
</ outage>
<outage ID=”107” type=” f a u l t ” s t a r t=” 26 .09 .2013 10 :05
” end=” 26 .09 .2013 16 :33 ” desc=”Vika−a lueen
rajaaminen . ”>
<s t a t i o n code=”5604” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”18”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”5605” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”10”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”5606” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”South” customers=”5”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”99998” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”
xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”East” customers=”5”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”12345” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”
xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”South” customers=”10”/>
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</ outage>
<outage ID=”108” type=” f a u l t ” s t a r t=” 26 .09 .2013 10 :30
” end=” 26 .09 .2013 18 :58 ” desc=”Sahkoverkon
rakentaminen . ”>
<s t a t i o n code=”6160” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”12”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8131” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”4”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8048” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”7”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8123” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”6”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8049” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”12”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”6114” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”11”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8141” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”8”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8003” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”9”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8112” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”North” customers=”12”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8058” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”North” customers=”8”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8053” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”North” customers=”7”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8047” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”West” customers=”8”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8016” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”North” customers=”10”/>
<s t a t i o n code=”8059” l a t=”xx . xxxxxxxxxxxxx” lng=”xx
. xxxxxxxxxxxxx” area=”North” customers=”8”/>
</ outage>
</ outages>
